College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2019

Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before
Arrest
Adam M. Gershowitz
William & Mary Law School, amgershowitz@wm.edu

Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

JUSTICE ON THE LINE:
PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING BEFORE
ARREST
Adam M. Gershowitz*
Police make more than eleven million arrests every year. Yet prosecutors dismiss about 25% of criminal charges with no conviction being entered. Needless arrests are therefore clogging the criminal justice system
and harming criminal defendants. For instance, Freddie Gray was fatally
injured in police custody after being arrested for possession of a switchblade knife. Prosecutors later announced, however, that they did not believe
the knife was actually illegal. If prosecutors had to approve warrantless
arrests before police could take suspects into custody, Freddie Gray would
still be alive. Yet prosecutors’ offices almost never dictate who the police
should or should not arrest. Based on interviews with forty prosecutors’
offices across the country, this Article describes how police—not prosecutors—call the shots about who is input into the criminal justice system.
This Article makes a counter-intuitive argument: we should be giving
prosecutors more power so they can better protect innocent defendants.
Prosecutors should be responsible for approving or rejecting all warrantless arrests. Early prosecutorial case screening will benefit individuals by
preventing unnecessary arrests, which in turn will reduce embarrassing
mug shots, unnecessary bail, loss of employment due to pretrial incarceration, and wrongful convictions. Avoiding unnecessary arrests will also reduce jail overcrowding and reduce the burden on judges, clerks, prosecutors, public defenders, and even the police. At present, prosecutorial
screening of arrests has been implemented in only a handful of jurisdictions. Prosecutorial prescreening can and should be dramatically expanded across the country to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice
system and prevent myriad harms to criminal suspects.

* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, William & Mary Law
School. I am grateful to the dozens of prosecutors who provided information about their offices. Many thanks
also to Jeff Bellin, Rachel Harmon, Ron Wright, and participants at the Neighborhood Criminal Justice
Roundtable for helpful comments. Fred Dingledy and Elizabeth Lester provided excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice system is clogged and overflowing.1 Each
year, police2 arrest more than 11 million individuals.3 Yet prosecutors ultimately
dismiss about 25% of criminal charges with no conviction being entered.4 Those
numbers tell us there are inputs needlessly clogging the criminal justice system.
Jails are holding pretrial detainees who will not end up being prosecuted. Prosecutors are dealing with cases they will ultimately dismiss. Public defenders are
overextended in part because of cases that never should have been on their plate
in the first place. And, of course, suspects are suffering through needless pretrial
incarceration. All of this suggests the criminal justice system should do a better
job screening which cases are input into the system in the first place.
Police make the arrests and prosecutors only enter the picture later—days
or even weeks later in some counties.5 But what if it were feasible for prosecutors
to screen cases at a much earlier stage—prior to arrest? What if some of the 25%
of ultimately dismissed cases were never input into the system in the first place?
And what if some of the overcharged cases—for instance, aggravated assault
felonies that should have been charged as simple assault misdemeanors—could
be charged at the correct level in the first place? After interviewing prosecutors
in forty different offices around the country, I was told multiple times that prosecutorial screening at the moment of a warrantless arrest would be “impossible.”
Yet there is at least one large jurisdiction where prosecutors—not the police—
are calling the shots about who is arrested without a warrant.
In Harris County, Texas (home to Houston) prosecutors screen cases prior
to arrest and thus are able to weed out weak cases before they begin to clog the
system and take up criminal justice resources.6 Every police officer in Harris

1. As scholars have repeatedly observed, there are more than 2.2 million people in prisons and jails, with
many serving incredibly long sentences. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM
IN AMERICA 1975–2025 10 (2016). Although this Article focuses on the moment of arrest, I do not mean to
suggest that sentence length has not contributed to mass imprisonment in the United States. One scholar, however, has boldly asserted that sentence length is not a primary driver of the rise of mass incarceration. See JOHN
F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 51–
77 (2017). For a persuasive argument that Professor Pfaff is wrong, see Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial
Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018).
2. Law enforcement officers have many names—for example, sheriffs, constables, and peace officers—
but for ease of exposition, I refer to all of them in this Article as “police.”
3. See Crime in the United States 2013, FBI: UCR, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
4. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl. 21 (2013). The percentage surely rises when misdemeanor cases are included. And some offices have much higher rates. See Bellin, supra note 1, at 846; Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 72–74 (2002).
5. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 711, 721 (2017).
6. See Interview with Jim Leitner, Bureau Chief of the Grand Jury Intake Division, Harris County, at the
Harris County District Attorney’s Office (June 5, 2017) [hereinafter Leitner Interview].
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County must call into an intake hotline and receive prosecutorial approval for
every warrantless arrest before taking a suspect to jail.7 Prosecutors have the option to reject the charges or to insist charges in weak cases be downgraded from
felonies to misdemeanors prior to jail bookings.8 Because the vast majority of
arrests are warrantless, these intake prosecutors are conducting an initial review
of an enormous portion of the criminal justice docket. They are therefore in a
position to prevent clogs before the system swallows weak cases.
Unfortunately, Harris County is nearly unique. While two other Texas
counties have adopted a version of the Harris County approach, interviews with
nearly forty other large and medium-sized prosecutors’ offices across the nation
show that prosecutors almost never screen warrantless arrests.9 While many
prosecutors’ offices operate hotlines so that police can call with questions, the
police still run the show.10 Across most of the United States, police simply arrest
suspects and process them into the system, with weak cases languishing until
prosecutors eventually dismiss or downgrade them days, weeks, or even months
later.11
The traditional process in which police make threshold decisions is problematic for the prosecutors who must handle the cases as well as the sheriffs
running the overcrowded jails, the clerks and judges handling overflowing dockets, and the public defenders who are already drowning in far too many cases.12
And the system is even worse for the arrestees who must spend unnecessary time
in jail, use what little savings they have to post bail, and possibly lose their jobs
while being detained.13 Moreover, some arrestees suffer further because their
warrantless arrests are reported to immigration authorities, public housing units,
and employers, even if the charges are ultimately dropped.14 And, of course,
some arrestees plead guilty simply to get out of jail before prosecutors and defense attorneys have an opportunity to discover the fatal flaws in their cases.15
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II reports how forty prosecutors’
offices around the country interact with police at the moment of warrantless arrests. Part II describes how many prosecutors’ offices have optional hotlines for
police to call with questions. Yet, because calls are not required, contact between
police and prosecutors at the point of arrest is relatively rare. Part II then explains
how the lack of prosecutorial screening allows weak cases to languish for days
or weeks before a prosecutor decides to dismiss the case or downgrade felony
charges to misdemeanor charges. Part II also explains how the delay in dropping
or reducing charges wastes criminal justice resources and deeply harms individuals who would otherwise not have been incarcerated. Part III then describes the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.; infra notes 250–61 and accompanying text.
See infra Sections II.B, III.C.
See infra Subsection II.B.2.
See infra Subsection II.D.2.a.
See infra Subsection II.D.3.
See infra Subsection II.D.2.c.
See infra Subsection II.D.2.d.
See infra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
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rigorous screening process in place in Harris County, Texas. Part III explains
how a prosecutor reviews every case before police make a warrantless arrest and
take a suspect to jail. Finally, Part IV makes the case that other medium-sized
and large jurisdictions should follow the Harris County model and screen warrantless arrests in real time. Part IV also explores whether it would be feasible
for states to fund centralized screening offices to be shared by smaller counties.
II. MOST PROSECUTOR OFFICES HAVE MINIMAL INVOLVEMENT IN PRESCREENING WARRANTLESS ARRESTS BY THE POLICE
Police officers have enormous power in the United States criminal justice
system. Legislatures have criminalized a huge number of offenses16 and have
authorized police to make arrests in most cases, even low-level misdemeanors.17
This Part explores (A) the relatively limited restrictions the Supreme Court has
imposed on warrantless arrests; (B) the fairly modest role of most prosecutors’
offices in working with police to determine which warrantless arrests to make;
(C) the reasons why prosecutors’ offices do not exert more influence in police
decisions to make warrantless arrests; and (D) the problems caused by having
limited prosecutorial oversight of warrantless arrests by the police.
A.

Minimal Constitutional Restrictions on Arrests, and Delayed Review by
Prosecutors

The Supreme Court has lightly regulated police authority to arrest suspects.18 And the Court has imposed no real burden on prosecutors to quickly
screen those arrests.
Of course, the Court has long required that police have a warrant to arrest
a suspect in her home.19 With the exception of a recent decision expanding the
exigent circumstances doctrine to allow police to create their own exigency,20
the Court has held a firm and rigorous line at the entrance to the home.21
Outside of the home is a far different story, however. Courts have long authorized police to arrest without a warrant outside of the home.22 So long as the
officers have probable cause, they can effectuate an arrest without first having to

16.
17.
36–37.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001).
See Stephen E. Henderson, “Move On” Orders as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1,
See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 321 (2016).
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011).
See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–17 (1976).
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check with a judge or a prosecutor.23 And, of course, the vast majority of arrests
are made without a warrant.24
Only after a warrantless arrest does the role of the judge formally apply.25
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court required that judges review warrantless arrests within forty-eight hours.26 The County of Riverside decision officially puts the burden on judges.27 In many jurisdictions, however, prosecutors
appear at the probable cause hearing to make the case that probable cause exists
for the arrest.28
Some jurisdictions are more rigorous. In about ten states, statutes require a
probable cause determination within twenty-four hours.29 But additional state
statutory protection appears to be the exception rather than the rule.30 In most of
the country, the only hard law governing arrests is the Supreme Court’s mandate
that there be a probable cause hearing forty-eight hours after arrest. Unless the
prosecutor’s office has an internal policy to insert itself earlier, that means that it
is police—not prosecutors—who are deciding initial inputs in the criminal justice
system.31 Put differently, if the prosecutor does not voluntarily step in earlier
than required by the Supreme Court, it is police officers—not prosecutors—that
decide who spends the weekend in jail. As described in Section II.C below, unfettered police authority can cause a host of problems. Before proceeding to those
problems though, it is important to have a sense of how police and prosecutors
interact prior to arrests being made. Section II.B below reviews the policies and
practices of more than three-dozen prosecutors’ offices in working with the police on warrantless arrests.

23. At common law, for an officer to make a warrantless arrest on a misdemeanor, the crime had to occur
“in view” of the officer. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 417–18. Modern decisions, however, have held that the Fourth
Amendment allows such arrests even if not “in view” of the officer. See, e.g., Woods v. City of Chicago, 234
F.3d 979, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has never held that a police officer violates the Fourth
Amendment merely by arresting someone without a warrant for a misdemeanor offense which did not occur in
the officer’s presence and/or did not involve a breach of the peace.”).
24. See Harmon, supra note 18, at 324.
25. See id.
26. 500 U.S. 44, 55–58 (1991). The Court left some wiggle room by explaining that review within fortyeight hours could still be unconstitutional if the probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Id. at
56–57. The Court also recognized that a valid hearing could occur more than forty-eight hours after arrest so long
as the State could prove a bona fide emergency. Id. at 57.
27. See id. at 56–57.
28. Of the forty prosecutor’s offices that responded to my request for information, a few indicated that its
prosecutors do not appear at the probable cause hearing. See infra notes 89, 144, 157, 240 and accompanying
text.
29. See ALA. CODE § 15-13-190 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1909 (2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.170
(West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:20 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §22-5-510 (2015); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 17.033(a) (West 2019); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130; MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-212;
MASS. R. CRIM P. 3.1; see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02 (setting period at thirty-six hours).
30. Most state statutes typically quote language from the County of Riverside decision and state that probable cause hearings must occur without “unnecessary delay.” See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2901 (West 2019).
31. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,
636 & n.60 (2014) (studying New York City and explaining that although the district attorney’s office can change
charges before arraignment, it is the police who determine initial charges).
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The Prosecutor’s Role in Warrantless Arrests: Mostly Minimal, But with
Variations and a Few Exceptions

Prosecutors typically participate in probable cause hearings within fortyeight hours of arrest.32 But do prosecutors become involved earlier, even though
they are not constitutionally required to do so? In particular, I sought to determine whether offices assign prosecutors to prescreen or otherwise help police
with warrantless arrests so weak cases are not brought into the criminal justice
system in the first place.33 In order to answer this question, I contacted prosecutors in the 100 largest counties in the United States as well as a few smaller jurisdictions.34 Many offices declined to respond, but I was able to speak or correspond with prosecutors from forty offices.35
While there certainly is not uniformity,36 the results of my study clearly
indicate that most prosecutors’ offices do not have significant interaction with
police at the time of warrantless arrests.37 Numerous offices have either a hotline
telephone number or a rotating prosecutor on call to answer questions from police.38 In most jurisdictions, however, phone calls from the police are the exception, not the rule.39 And when police do call, they are mostly seeking legal guidance for what the officers think are the difficult cases.40 In almost all
jurisdictions, police do not need to receive permission from prosecutors in order
to effectuate a warrantless arrest and lock up a suspect.41 In the subsections below, I detail the different approaches prosecutors use to provide guidance to the
police.
1.

Counties with No Prosecutor Hotline and Very Limited Prosecutorial Role
in Warrantless Arrests

In some jurisdictions, prosecutors’ offices have no substantial role in advising the police whether to make warrantless arrests.42 For instance, a veteran
prosecutor in Los Angeles explained:

32. Wright & Miller, supra note 4, at 32 n.9.
33. The leading work on prosecutorial screening considers screening at a later stage. See id.
34. Ron Wright and Kay Levine have thoughtfully observed that research on prosecutors’ offices focuses
too heavily on large jurisdictions. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Place Matters in Prosecution Research, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 675, 679 (2017).
35. I divided the jurisdictions equally with a research assistant. We first called each office in an effort to
speak with a prosecutor or public information officer who could answer the questions. We then followed up by
email with an identical set of questions for each office.
36. See Ronald F. Wright et al., The Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 28
(2014) (cautioning against reaching broad conclusions about all prosecutors based on data points from a few
offices).
37. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.1.
38. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
39. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
40. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
41. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
42. See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
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[T]he nature of law enforcement in a jurisdiction of our size is such that an
officer stopping midstream to seek advice on making a warrantless arrest
is highly unlikely. Most warrantless arrests occur when the officer sees the
violation occur (such as driving under the influence), or discovers it during
lawful activity (narcotics found during a lawful search of a parolee, for
example) . . . . Such situations do not call for prior consultation with the
prosecutor.43
This prosecutor further noted that “in my 2 years as a police officer I never consulted a prosecutor before making an arrest; in my 31 years as a prosecutor, I
don’t recall ever having been asked for such advice before an arrest was made.”44
The situation in some other California counties is similar. In Fresno
County, California, the District Attorney’s Office does not maintain a hotline,
and police only call individual prosecutors for advice on arrests “very very
rarely” and “only in serious cases.”45 Fresno County prosecutors do not become
involved in cases until thirty-six to forty-eight hours after arrest.46 Similarly, in
San Joaquin County, California, a prosecutor explained that we “do not involve
ourselves in warrantless arrests” although there “may be an unusual case where
an officer will call an intake/charging deputy during business hours.”47 Prosecutors in San Joaquin typically review the police report the day following the arrest.48 In Kern County, California (home to Bakersfield), the District Attorney’s
Office does not have a hotline and only reviews cases after they are formally
submitted to the office, which is within two days for warrantless arrestees in custody and up to a few weeks later for those no longer in custody.49 Finally, in
Contra Costa, California, prosecutors “generally do not get involved until the
case is brought in for filing.”50 When the suspect has been booked and released
(as happens, for example, in a typical drunk driving case), the prosecutor’s office
“usually won’t become involved in the case until months later.”51 If the suspect
is still in custody, prosecutors will typically first look at the case thirty-six to
forty-eight hours after arrest.52
Some large prosecutors’ offices in other states likewise do not offer much
advice to police at the moment of arrest.53 For example, a spokesman for the
Philadelphia County prosecutor’s office in Pennsylvania explained that “we do
43. See E-mail from Devallis Rutledge, Special Counsel to the Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s
Office, to author (May 17, 2017) (on file with author).
44. Id. Los Angeles County does have a twenty-four hour call-in line for police to speak with a prosecutor,
but it is primarily for “help obtaining search warrants, wiretaps, or other court orders.” Id.
45. E-mail from Steve E. Wright, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Fresno Cty., to author (May 24, 2017) (on file
with author).
46. See id.
47. See E-mail from Robert Himelblau, Supervising Deputy Dist. Attorney, San Joaquin Cty., to Elizabeth
Lester (June 15, 2017, 5:37 PM) (on file with author).
48. See id.
49. See E-mail from Mark Pafford, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, Kern Cty., to Elizabeth Lester (June 19,
2017, 12:59 PM) (on file with author).
50. See E-mail from Brian Feinberg, Deputy Dist. Attorney, to author (June 16, 2017) (on file with author).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
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not provide advice about whether or not to arrest a suspect . . . . The police determine whether or not to effectuate an arrest.”54 Thereafter, a case moves to the
charging unit of the prosecutor’s office, which typically decides within eleven
hours whether to file charges.55
The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office in New York operates similarly. Suffolk County does not have a hotline, and prosecutors do not talk with
police in run-of-the-mill cases, though they do sometimes answer questions
when police call in specialized cases such as child abuse.56 Like Philadelphia,
though, Suffolk County prosecutors review cases fairly quickly after arrest, typically within twelve- to twenty-four hours of a warrantless arrest.57 Similarly, the
San Francisco County District Attorney’s Office in California does not have a
hotline for police to call about warrantless arrests, though police can call individual departments in the office to ask questions about cases.58 The San Francisco office stressed that even when police do reach out with questions, prosecutors do not provide conclusions for the police about whether or not there is
probable cause to make an arrest.59 In the ordinary case, prosecutors only become
involved in the case about a day after arrest.60
In Pima County, Arizona prosecutors handle felonies while the Tucson City
Attorney’s Office handles most misdemeanors.61 Neither jurisdiction has a hotline for police to talk with prosecutors prior to arrest.62 For felony cases, a Pima
County prosecutor reviews the case at the probable cause hearing within twelve
hours of arrest.63 In misdemeanor cases, judges conduct probable cause reviews
in the evenings, but prosecutors are only on staff Monday through Friday from 9
a.m. to 5 p.m.64 If a defendant is arrested on misdemeanor charges during the
weekend, a prosecutor will not review the case until Monday morning.
Some medium-sized counties also reported that contact between police and
prosecutors at the time of arrest is fairly rare.65 For example, in El Paso County,
Colorado (home to Colorado Springs), the prosecutor’s office does not maintain
a dedicated hotline for police to consult with prosecutors and calls from police

54. E-mail from Cameron L. Kline, Commc’ns Dir. & Spokesperson, Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to
author (May 18, 2017) (on file with author).
55. See id.
56. See Interview with Michael J. Miller, Chief of Appellate Bureau, Suffolk Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office
(June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Miller Interview].
57. See id.
58. See E-mail from Nikesh Patel, S.F. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (July 7, 2017) (on
file with author).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See E-mail from Amelia Cramer, Chief Deputy Pima Cty. Attorney, to author (June 2, 2017, 11:03
AM) (on file with author).
62. See id.; Interview with M.J. Raciti, Principal Assistant Prosecuting City Attorney (June 2, 2017) [hereinafter Raciti Interview].
63. See E-mail from Amelia Cramer, supra note 61. Thereafter, prosecutors will not review the case again
for up to eight days. See id.
64. See Raciti Interview, supra note 62.
65. See infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
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occur only on “rare occasions.”66 Likewise, in Salt Lake County, Utah, prosecutors do not maintain a hotline and speak with police about warrantless arrests
only “occasionally.”67
In Montgomery County, Maryland, the State’s Attorney’s Office does not
maintain a hotline, though police have some prosecutors’ cell phone numbers
and are instructed to call the Deputy State’s Attorney with questions.68 Nevertheless, the Deputy State’s Attorney explained that calls from police to prosecutors are “infrequent” and mostly occur in homicides, cases where juveniles will
be charged as adults, or cases likely to generate news coverage.69 The Deputy
State’s Attorney explained that the Montgomery County office would like to interact more with police at the time of warrantless arrests because the “earlier we
can weigh in on a case” the better.70 Unfortunately, the Montgomery County,
Maryland State’s Attorney’s Office believes the cost of hiring prosecutors to
communicate with police at the time of arrest would be prohibitively expensive.71
In sum, in a number of large and medium-sized counties across the United
States, police have total discretion to make warrantless arrests and seek virtually
no feedback from prosecutors in doing so.
2.

Counties with a Dedicated Prosecutor Hotline for Unusual Cases

In a considerable number of counties, the prosecutor’s office has a system
set up for police to contact prosecutors if they want guidance prior to making
warrantless arrests.72 Some jurisdictions maintain a dedicated hotline for police
to call.73 In other jurisdictions, prosecutors take turns giving out their cell phone
number to the police and are essentially “on call” the way an obstetrician is for
delivering babies.74 In all of these jurisdictions, phone calls from the police about
whether to make a warrantless arrest seem to be the exception and not the rule.75
The police are not obligated to call prosecutors for guidance and only do so when
the officers think the case is complicated.76
For instance, in Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, there is a rotating list
of prosecutors who are available for the police to contact about legal issues at
any time afterhours, seven days a week.77 There is no requirement for police to
66. See E-mail from Lee Richards, Pub. Info. Officer, El Paso Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth
Lester (June 15, 2017, 6:07 PM) (on file with author).
67. E-mail from Blake Nakaumura, Salt Lake Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 15, 2017) (on
file with author).
68. See Interview with Peter Feeney, Deputy State’s Attorney, Montgomery Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office
(July 10, 2017) [hereinafter Feeney Interview].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text.
77. E-mail from Maria Miller, Wayne Cty. Assistant Prosecutor, to author (May 16, 2017) (on file with
author).
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call prosecutors, however, and in fact, they only seek input from prosecutors on
search warrants and other legal matters in a limited set of cases.78 In Franklin
County (Columbus), Ohio, there is no hotline for police to call, although prosecutors in certain divisions give out their cell phone numbers to law enforcement.79 According to a spokesperson in Columbus, “in run-of-the mill type cases
it is atypical for the prosecutors to get calls from the police, however in our big
cases, cold cases, sex abuse cases, white collar crime cases, and gang cases, our
prosecutors do get calls from the police.”80
Similarly, a prosecutor in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (home to Pittsburgh) explained that “we have a monthly on call list that goes out to law enforcement . . . . Our prosecutors will often receive calls following an on view
arrest if the arresting officer wants some guidance on exactly what to charge once
the suspect is in custody.”81 While the Allegheny prosecutor’s office makes itself
available to the police to answer complicated legal questions, it “would never
require a police officer to call us before making an on view arrest.”82
Numerous jurisdictions that staff prosecutor hotlines report that calls are
rare.83 Consider the similar approach in three Texas counties. In Fort Bend
County (in the suburbs of Houston), prosecutors are available twenty-four hours
a day, but the office reports receiving calls only “a few times weekly.”84 Bexar
County, Texas (which is home to San Antonio) operates similarly.85 The office
does not have a hotline, but it does staff a prosecutor twenty-four hours a day to
be available to answer questions from police.86 The police, however, tend to call
prosecutors only in cases with unusual facts or tricky legal issues; in run-of-themill cases police do not consult prosecutors.87 In Denton County, Texas, prosecutors have a dedicated phone line, but calls from police come only in unusual
cases and are “fairly rare.”88 Moreover, in Denton County—which has over
600,000 people—prosecutors “do not attend any probable cause hearings and do
not have anything to do with the [warrantless arrest] case[s] at all until
weeks/months later.”89

78. Id.
79. See E-mail from Christy C. McCreary, Pub. Info. Officer, Franklin Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to
author (May 31, 2017) (on file with author).
80. Id. (June 1, 2017) (on file with author).
81. E-mail from Mike Manko, Allegheny Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (May 16, 2017) (on file
with author).
82. Id.
83. E-mail from Wesley Wittig, Exec. Assistant Dist. Attorney, Fort Bend Cty., to author (May 19, 2017)
(on file with author).
84. Id.
85. See E-mail from Jennifer Saucedo Rodriguez, Bexar Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 8,
2017) (on file with author).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. E-mail from Jamie Beck, First Assistant Dist. Attorney, to Elizabeth Lester (June 8, 2017) (on file
with author).
89. Id.
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Prosecutors’ offices in other parts of the country also reported that calls
from police are infrequent.90 For example, in Ventura County, California, if police have questions, they can call an answering service and be put in touch with
a prosecutor.91 The prosecutors take turns being on call for one week at a time.92
Calls are rare, however, and typically happen only in “high profile or unusual
cases.”93 In Prince George’s County, Maryland, prosecutors are available by
phone at all hours, but they do not give final direction about whether police
should charge, and in fact, calls are “pretty rare and only in a high-profile or
unusual case.”94 Similarly, in Baltimore County, Maryland, calls are not mandatory and officers must page a prosecutor on duty to ask question.95
Lee County, Florida (home to Fort Myers) also has a phone number for
police to ask questions about probable cause, but the prosecutors “will not tell an
officer to arrest a person.”96 Calls are “pretty rare” and are typically for “unusual”
and “high-profile” cases, usually involving murders.97 Indeed, in cases in Lee
County, the prosecutor does not become involved in the case until arraignment
and typically reviews the file for the first time “10 to 15 days after arrest.”98 In
Portsmouth County, a medium-sized county in Virginia, a prosecutor is on call
twenty-four hours a day to answer questions from police, but phone calls are
“fairly rare” and typically happen only in unusual cases.99 In the ordinary case,
prosecutors do not become involved until after arraignment.100
Finally, in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota, the prosecutor’s
office does not have a hotline but has prosecutors available twenty-four hours a
day to answer questions from police.101 Yet calls from law enforcement are “rare
and likely [only happen] in serious or high profile crimes.”102 Indeed, the office
experimented with “having a prosecutor stay [in the office] until 7:00 p.m. to
answer any questions the police might wish to ask.”103 A prosecutor who participated in the pilot program noted, “I almost never got a call and we terminated

90. See, e.g., E-mail from Mike Frawley, Ventura Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (June
14, 2017) (on file with author).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See E-mail from Leslie W. Graves, Prince George’s Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester
(June 19, 2017) (on file with author).
95. See Interview with Officer Patrick Helphensteine, Balt. Cty. Police Dep’t (June 9, 2017) [hereinafter
Helphensteine Interview].
96. E-mail from Kelly S. Worcester, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Lee Cty. Fla., to Elizabeth Lester (June 14,
2017) (on file with author).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. E-mail from Stephanie Morales, Portsmouth Commonwealth’s Attorney, to author (Aug. 17, 2017) (on
file with author).
100. See id.
101. See E-mail from Alan Harris, Managing Assistant Hennepin Cty. Attorney, to author (June 7, 2017).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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the experiment.”104 Accordingly, in Hennepin County, prosecutors ordinarily do
not see cases until thirty-six to sixty hours after arrest.105
The twelve counties described above have created a specific hotline or call
procedure for police to seek advice from prosecutors about warrantless arrests.
Yet all the counties indicated that calls are rare and typically only occur in highprofile, very serious, or very unusual cases.
3.

Counties with More Frequent Police-Prosecutor Interactions

Some jurisdictions responded that their prosecutors have more frequent interactions with police about warrantless arrests. For instance, San Diego, California assigns one prosecutor to be on site at the police department and another
to be on site at the sheriff’s department.106 These prosecutors are available to
answer questions from police, for instance in narcotics investigations.107 A thirtyyear veteran prosecutor in the San Diego office, however, explained that prosecutors “never tell anyone in law enforcement whether they should arrest someone
[because] it’s not our job.”108 Rather, in the ordinary case, prosecutors first touch
the case about forty-eight hours after arrest.109
Other jurisdictions use a more traditional hotline and report that calls from
police happen with some frequency. For example, in San Bernardino County,
California, prosecutors make themselves available to police by phone.110 While
police are not obligated to speak with prosecutors prior to making warrantless
arrests, officers do contact prosecutors in a variety of cases when there are legal
or factual issues they need clarification on.111 Similarly, in Nassau County (Long
Island), New York, prosecutors staff a hotline twenty-four hours a day, and police call “fairly frequently” to seek advice on warrantless arrests.112 In Nassau
County, however, officers are not obligated to call the hotline and the prosecutors
“do not dictate” when the police should arrest.113
Multiple offices in Massachusetts indicated that they answer questions
from police twenty-four hours per day and that calls are not rare.114 In Worcester,
Massachusetts, calls are not mandatory, but “communication is frequent,” particularly in homicide and motor vehicle crash cases.115 Just a short drive down
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Telephone Interview with David Greenberg, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney (May 24, 2017) [hereinafter
Greenberg Interview].
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See E-mail from Christopher Lee, San Bernardino Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 1, 2017)
(on file with author).
111. See id.
112. E-mail from Brendan Brosh, Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 5, 2017) (on file with
author).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., E-mail from Paul Jarvey, Deputy Dir. of Commc’ns, Worcester Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office,
to Elizabeth Lester (June 19, 2017) (on file with author).
115. Id.
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the road, in Norfolk, Massachusetts, prosecutors also have a twenty-four-hour
hotline that is staffed by senior attorneys.116 Police are not obligated to seek input
from prosecutors, but calls are “not at all rare,” nor are they solely for high-profile cases.117 In Essex County, Massachusetts (home to Salem), prosecutors staff
a phone line so police can consult on “many issues,” including whether to make
warrantless arrests.118 Nevertheless, even though there are a limited number of
offenses in Massachusetts for which police can make warrantless arrests, officers
are not obligated to call because “it would be impossible for police to call us in
every case.”119
In Snohomish County, Washington, prosecutors rotate on a weekly basis to
answer calls from police.120 The officers are not required to call prosecutors prior
to arrest, but police typically call prosecutors for the most serious felonies, such
as murder and rape, and they also call when there are unique circumstances.121
Similarly, in Jefferson County, Kentucky (home to Louisville), certain divisions
(such as homicide, fraud, child abuse, and consumer protection) have a prosecutor liaison for police to consult with directly about cases.122 Police can call prosecutors at any time of day, though they are not required to do so.123 In Will
County, Illinois (home to Joliet), police are not obligated to call prior to warrantless arrests, but an experienced prosecutor wears a pager twenty-four hours a day
to answer any questions police may have.124 According to a Will County prosecutor, police from larger precincts tend not to call very often, whereas officers
from smaller precincts do tend to call, though primarily in felony cases.125 In
Gwinnett, Georgia, police are able to page a prosecutor’s cell phone twenty-four
hours a day.126 Calls are not mandatory, and according to a Gwinnett County
prosecutor, police call prosecutors about three or four times a day.127
A few jurisdictions go further by not only maintaining a hotline for police
to call but also mandating calls prior to certain types of warrantless arrests. In
Shelby County, Tennessee (home to Memphis), police officers are required to
contact the prosecutor’s office prior to making a warrantless arrest for homicide,

116. See E-mail from David Traub, Norfolk Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (June 28, 2017)
(on file with author).
117. Id.
118. See E-mail from Carrie Kimball-Monahan, Dir. of Commc’ns, Essex Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to
Elizabeth Lester (June 14, 2017) (on file with author).
119. Id.
120. See Telephone Interview with Bob Lenz, Chief of Operations, Snohomish Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office
(June 14, 2017) [hereinafter Lenz Interview].
121. See id.
122. See E-mail from Jeffrey Cooke, Jefferson Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (June 16,
2017) (on file with author).
123. See id.
124. See Interview with Kathy Patton, Assistant State’s Attorney, Will Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, in Joliet, Ill. (June 22, 2017) [hereinafter Patton Interview].
125. See id.
126. See Interview with Ron Blackburn (June 26, 2017) [hereinafter Blackburn Interview].
127. See id.
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armed robbery, and some other violent crimes.128 The reason is not only to help
police select the correct charges but also to ensure that all possible evidence is
collected.129 In Essex County, New Jersey (home to Newark), prosecutors are
“involved in the charging decisions in virtually all the [homicide] cases prior to
arrest” but do not advise the police on lower-level street arrests.130 In Lake
County, Illinois, prosecutors screen all felony and domestic violence cases prior
to arrests.131 This amounts to roughly forty calls per day from police to prosecutors.132
Finally, some prosecutors’ offices counseled that even though hotline calls
are rare, it is possible that police are calling individual prosecutors who they have
strong working relationships with. For instance, in Las Vegas, Nevada, the Clark
County District Attorney’s Office does not have a hotline for police to call with
questions about warrantless arrests, but it does have a phone number for police
to call for help with search warrants.133 A Clark County prosecutor explained
that for every roughly sixty calls to the search warrant number, about four calls
are from police asking for advice about warrantless arrests.134 The prosecutor
also explained that some police likely call prosecutors who they work closely
with.135
In sum, a number of counties reported that their prosecutors had some interaction with police at the moment of warrantless arrests. In a few of these jurisdictions calls were mandatory for certain particularly serious offenses. In
most, however, the police still had discretion whether to consult with prosecutors
or not.
In total, after gathering information from forty large and medium-sized
prosecutors’ offices, I found very limited prosecutorial prescreening of warrantless arrests.136 Some offices acknowledged doing virtually no prescreening.137
Many offices staff prosecutors to answer calls from the police, but noted that
calls were infrequent.138 A few prosecutors’ offices reported that calls happen
regularly but noted that those calls are typically only in the most serious felony
cases.139 Other offices cautioned that it is impossible to determine the amount of
128. E-mail from Vince Higgins, Office of Shelby Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (May 23, 2017,
2:43 PM) (on file with author).
129. See, e.g., Lenz interview, supra note 120.
130. E-mail from Katherine Carter, Pub. Info. Officer, Essex Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, to author (May 30,
2017).
131. See E-mail from Cynthia Vargas, Commc’ns Manager, Lake Cty. State’s Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (June 12, 2017).
132. See id.
133. See Interview with Nelle Christianson, Assistant Dist. Attorney (June 19, 2017) [hereinafter Christianson Interview].
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. My study sets aside highly unusual cases, in which prosecutorial involvement prior to arrest is quite
different. See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 762–64 (2016) (describing considerable pre-arrest vetting by prosecutors when police officers are the suspects).
137. See, e.g., E-mail from Brian Feinberg, supra note 50.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., E-mail from Cameron L. Kline, supra note 54.
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advice being given to police because some police officers check with individual
prosecutors with whom they have close working relationships.140 Finally, a small
number of jurisdictions mandate that police clear serious felony arrests with prosecutors in advance. With the exception of one office that required prescreening
of domestic violence cases, however, none of the offices discussed above required any prosecutorial involvement in warrantless misdemeanor arrests.141
A few jurisdictions reported that prosecutors review warrantless arrests
within twelve hours.142 More commonly, prosecutors stated that they see cases
for the first time about thirty-six to forty-eight hours after arrest.143 One county
noted that its prosecutors typically do not see cases until two weeks after arrest,
while another jurisdiction acknowledged not appearing at the probable cause
hearing and thus not reviewing warrantless arrests until weeks or months later.144
C.

The Reasons for Limited Prosecutorial Involvement Prior to Arrest

As detailed above, most jurisdictions have limited involvement in advising
police prior to warrantless arrests. Prosecutors’ offices offered two main reasons
why their attorneys do not take a more hands-on role in screening cases at the
moment of arrest: (1) screening warrantless arrests would be labor-intensive and
thus prohibitively expensive; and (2) prosecutorial involvement in screening
warrantless arrests would risk the loss of absolute immunity that courts typically
afford to prosecutors.145
A few prosecutors’ offices noted the considerable cost and logistical challenge of having prosecutors involved in warrantless arrests.146 For instance, the
Essex County, New Jersey office explained that “[w]ith approximately 250 arrests a week in Newark—the largest city in our jurisdiction—consulting a prosecutor prior to each arrest would be a tremendous undertaking.”147 Similarly, a
Los Angeles prosecutor stressed the logistical challenge of having prosecutors
deal with more than 100 law enforcement agencies in a county with a population
of 10 million people.148
In addition to logistics and cost, some prosecutors’ offices expressed concerns about exposing their offices and staff to civil liability.149 Prosecutors have
absolute immunity for actions taken in their prosecutorial capacity.150 When
prosecutors act in an investigative capacity, however, they are only entitled to

140. See E-mail from Carrie Kimball-Monahan, supra note 118.
141. See, e.g., E-mail from Jeffrey Cooke, supra note 122.
142. See, e.g., E-mail from Cameron L. Kline, supra note 54.
143. See, e.g., E-mail from Steve E. Wright, supra note 45.
144. See supra notes 89, 98, and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; infra note 152 and accompanying text.
146. See E-mail from Katherine Carter, supra note 130; E-mail from Devallis Rutledge, supra note 43.
147. See E-mail from Katherine Carter, supra note 130.
148. See E-mail from Devallis Rutledge, supra note 43.
149. See id.; E-mail from Steve E. Wright, supra note 45.
150. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 80–89 (discussing Imbler and other cases).
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qualified immunity.151 Prosecutors in Clark County (Las Vegas); Suffolk, New
York; Contra Costa, California; Fresno, California; and Los Angeles, California
all expressed concern that too great of involvement in advising police could result in the prospect of civil liability.152 Moreover, one New York prosecutor explained that the legislature had taken steps to authorize indemnification of police—but not prosecutors—for civil judgments.153
The cost, logistics, and liability concerns voiced by multiple prosecutors’
offices are surely sincere. As explained below, however, limited involvement by
prosecutors at the moment of warrantless arrest likely results in a large number
of weak cases being put into the criminal justice system.154 This has ramifications
for jailers, defendants, clerks, judges, public defenders, and the prosecutors
themselves.
D.

Problems with Limited Prosecutorial Oversight of Police Decisions to
Make Warrantless Arrests

As Section II.B demonstrates, in the vast majority of cases, police make
warrantless arrests without first consulting a prosecutor. In many counties, however, there is no prosecutorial review of warrantless arrests for thirty-six to fortyeight hours, until the judge conducts a probable cause hearing.155 And at that
hearing, prosecutors may not examine the case thoroughly.156 In two jurisdictions
I spoke with, prosecutors do not even appear at the probable cause hearing and
do not become involved in the case until weeks or months later.157 Late and limited prosecutorial review creates a number of problems for not just the arrestees
but also for prosecutors and other actors in the criminal justice system.
1.

Evidence Collection and Trial Problems for Prosecutors Down the Road

If prosecutors are not consulted about warrantless arrests, they are not able
to communicate to police the need to seize and log certain evidence. Police are
trained investigators, but they typically have very little legal training and may
not be well positioned to understand all of the evidence the prosecution may need
to prove each element of a case.158
For example, in a domestic assault case, a patrol officer might not recognize
the importance of taking pictures of all of the victim’s injuries at the scene. If the
complainant tells the officer she plans to press charges, the officer may take the
suspect into custody and assume the victim will cooperate with prosecutors down
151. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
152. See Christianson Interview, supra note 133; E-mail from Devallis Rutledge, supra note 43, E-mail
from Steve E. Wright, supra note 45.
153. See Miller Interview, supra note 56.
154. See infra notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., E-mail from Steve E. Wright, supra note 45.
156. See Harmon, supra note 18, at 341.
157. See E-mail from Jamie Beck, supra note 88; E-mail from Kelly S. Worcester, supra note 96.
158. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 103–09 (2011) (describing limited
substantive criminal law training provided to police).
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the road to demonstrate her injuries. Unfortunately, many domestic violence victims later recant their complaints and refuse to cooperate with the prosecution.159
Weeks later, the victim’s injuries will no longer be visible and without photographs the prosecutor will have to dismiss the case.160
Police might also fail to appreciate the importance of forensic testing. Police might not insist a nurse conduct a forensic examination of a sexual assault
victim, thus losing valuable evidence.161 Or police might erroneously assume that
because forensic testing is unlikely to turn up fingerprints or DNA that it is not
worth doing. Yet, as prosecutors know, not testing evidence (even if it is unlikely
to turn up anything incriminating) can be devastating in the eyes of a jury. For
instance, if police do not test a gun or a bag for fingerprints or DNA, the defense
attorney can turn to the jury and say: “The police did not even test for possible
evidence!” Because police do not have experience trying cases, they do not have
the same perspective as prosecutors who know the importance of checking all of
the boxes in the eyes of the jury.162

159. See Jim Leckrone & Mary Wisniewski, Study Shows Why Domestic Violence Victims Drop Charges,
REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-domestic-violence-study-idUSTRE77I
6FE20110819.
160. See Interview with Ed McClees, former Harris Cty. prosecutor (June 6, 2017) [hereinafter McClees
Interview].
161. See id.
162. See id.
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Harm to Arrestees Caused by Lack of Prosecutorial Involvement
a.

Unnecessary Arrests: Police File Charges That Prosecutors Would
Not Have Brought

Police arrest suspects in some—perhaps many—cases that prosecutors
never would have arrested in.163 At a broad level, we know this because prosecutors dismiss an enormous percentage of cases after police have filed charges.164
On average, prosecutors dismiss 25%165 of felony charges, and in some jurisdictions that number can be as high as 40% or 50%.166 In her recent study of New
York City, Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann found that prosecutors declined to
prosecute between 17,000 and 30,500 misdemeanor arrests each year.167 There
are at least two big-picture types of cases prosecutors dismiss outright without a
plea bargain: (1) cases in which prosecutors recognize they could never prove
the necessary elements of the crime charged; and (2) cases in which the prosecutor could prove all of the elements but determines, in the interest of justice, that
some or all of the charges should be dismissed.
Let’s start with the cases that prosecutors cannot prove. Imagine that a police officer sees someone driving erratically and the officer turns on his siren and
lights to pull over the car. Imagine also that the driver, while not speeding, does
not immediately pull over his vehicle. The officer arrests the driver not for the
original traffic offense, but for evading arrest because of the delay in pulling
over. It is not uncommon for police to claim a suspect was evading arrest.168
Prosecutors know, however, that to prove evasion they must show that the driver
intentionally fled from a person he knew was a law enforcement officer.169 But
the driver might not have initially seen the police car in his rear-view mirror. Or
the driver might not have pulled over immediately because he was nervous and
did not see a place to safely pull off the road. Or, even if those stories are not
true, the prosecutor knows that a defense attorney could very easily convince a
jury that reasonable doubt exists.170 So, while police are keen to arrest for evading arrest, prosecutors are not.171
Consider the related crime of resisting arrest. Imagine that a police officer
is making a valid arrest for driving while intoxicated. The officer pulls the
163. See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 342 (2017).
164. See REAVES, supra note 4, at 24 tbl.21.
165. See id. Although it has largely escaped attention, judges in a minority of states also have the power to
dismiss cases. See Roberts, supra note 163, at 330 (exploring judicial power in nineteen states).
166. See REAVES, supra note 4, at 22. Of course, many of these dismissals happen down the road when a
witness recants, or other factual information becomes clearer. But in a sizable number, prosecutors likely would
know at the very outset that the case would be dismissed.
167. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 31, at 645.
168. Interview with Laura Killinger, former Harris Cty. prosecutor (June 3, 2017) [hereinafter Killinger
Interview].
169. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (West 2019).
170. See Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers’ Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126 YALE L.J.
1730, 1747 (2017) (“Police think in terms of ‘probable cause’ (the standard for arrest), while prosecutors think
in terms of ‘reasonable doubt’ (the standard for conviction).”).
171. See Killinger Interview, supra note 168.
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driver’s hands behind his back to handcuff them. The driver—perhaps because
he is drunk and not in firm control of his bodily movements, or perhaps because
having his hands pulled by the officer is painful—recoils and pulls his hands
away from the officer. In this common scenario, police sometimes seek charges
for resisting arrest. Prosecutors, on the other hand, are more skeptical and ultimately dismiss some of the resisting cases.172
Similarly, when a suspect or his family or friends are verbally abusive during an arrest, police often want to file additional charges for making a terroristic
threat because the suspect has threatened imminent violence.173 These charges
can be legitimate if the suspect makes a realistic and imminent threat, but often
suspects are simply mouthing off and engaged in tough talk. Prosecutors often
dismiss these charges.174
Examples are not limited to the “contempt of cop” situations outlined
above. Police and prosecutors see many cases differently, with police often focused on the moment of arrest, while prosecutors think about whether a conviction is likely.175 For example, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff has observed,
police sometimes arrest “to clear a street corner, to manifest a police presence in
a high-crime neighborhood, [or] to induce cooperation from potential witnesses.”176 Similarly, according to sociologist and former police officer Peter
Moskos, police in Baltimore regularly order people to “move on” and arrest them
if they do not comply.177 In New York, between 1992 and 2004, police continued
to make thousands of loitering arrests even after the Second Circuit had struck
down the loitering statute and enjoined the City from filing charges under it.178
Police may think that arresting in these types of cases is the appropriate course
of action for “maintaining order,”179 but prosecutors will often dismiss these
cases because they are impossible to prove.180
Or imagine that an individual brings a gun through airport security—a
problem that happens more than 3,000 times per year in the United States.181

172. See id.
173. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (West 2019).
174. See Interview with Danny Lacayo, former Harris Cty. prosecutor (June 7, 2017) [hereinafter Lacayo
Interview].
175. See Abel, supra note 170.
176. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1332 (2012). Police also may arrest for
other “order maintenance” reasons such as a desire to conduct a search or interrogation, or to procure DNA
evidence or mug shots. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1695 (2010); Harmon, supra note 18, at 356–57.
177. See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 114–17
(2008).
178. See Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268,
275 (2015).
179. See id. at 271.
180. See Natapoff, supra note 176, at 1336 (noting that prosecutors dismiss one-third of Baltimore loitering
arrests).
181. See Fredrick Kunkle, Trump Aide Was Among Record Numbers Taking a Gun Through TSA Checkpoint Last Year; Police Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/
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Many law enforcement officers want to file charges for bringing a weapon into
a prohibited area, surely because they think charges are truly merited.182 Yet
prosecutors know that those cases are very difficult to prove.183 Defendants can
make a plausible (and often true) claim that they simply forgot the weapon was
in the bag.184 Because some state statutes require the defendant to have intentionally brought the weapon into an airport,185 many prosecutors will dismiss those
charges.186
In addition to cases that are difficult to prove, prosecutors sometimes dismiss cases as a matter of justice, even though police would have followed
through on charges.187 For example, one former prosecutor relayed a story of
police seeking to arrest a suspect for siphoning $40 worth of gas out of an automobile.188 Police sought to charge the suspect with burglary of a motor vehicle—
a felony—because theft of $40 was a low-level offense that carried no jail
time.189 Although the prosecutor recognized that it might be theoretically possible to meet the elements of the burglary statute by siphoning gas, she believed in
the interests of justice that the case did not merit felony charges.190
Or imagine that police catch a suspect with half-a-dozen different types of
drugs and arrest him for intent to distribute. Each different type of drug is a different offense, and the police officer may want to charge six offenses. The prosecutor, however, may not see the point in filing six separate charges and will
instead drop most of the charges for the less serious drugs.191
Finally, while most police are honorable and hardworking, some departments pressure officers to numerically justify what they have done on their
shifts.192 An officer with few or no arrests might have worked hard and effectively for the community but have no way to show it to superior officers. In a
world where CompStat is prevalent and officers in some departments are pressured to bring in good statistics,193 it should not be surprising that police might

2017/01/27/trump-aide-was-among-record-numbers-taking-a-gun-through-tsa-checkpoint-last-year/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6fd4d8f4450a (noting that the TSA found more than 3,300 firearms in carryon bags in
2016).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(5) (West 2019).
186. I am grateful to former Harris County prosecutor Ed McClees for this example.
187. Police may become upset by prosecutors’ “nullification” of charges and try to exert pressure on prosecutors to proceed. See Bowers, supra note 176, at 1700–01; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification,
52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1271 (2011). Moreover, as Professor Rachel Harmon has argued, there are many instances
in which police could resolve situations with citations rather than by making an arrest. See Harmon, supra note
18, at 332–43.
188. See Killinger Interview, supra note 168.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. I observed prosecutors repeatedly do this during an intake shift at the Harris County District Attorney’s
Office. See infra note 252.
192. See JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT BY
MANIPULATION 24–26 (2012).
193. See id.
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(either purposefully or subconsciously) make more arrests than prosecutors
would make.
In short, there is good reason to believe that there would be considerably
fewer arrests if police consulted with prosecutors at the moment of a warrantless
arrest. These “unnecessary arrests” are not simply erased when prosecutors later
drop the charges. To the contrary, as explained below, arrestees suffer considerable harm up to and after the charges are dismissed.
b. Arrest Reports and Mug Shots: The Internet Remembers
For defendants, an unnecessary arrest is not just about spending a night (or
many nights) in jail. Unnecessary arrests also create unwanted publicity and a
permanent internet record that can hinder the arrestee for years to come.194
First, many newspapers publish a police blotter that lists all arrests made
by the police.195 Once printed, the arrest record exists on the Internet forever and
can negatively impact a suspect when applying for a job.
Additionally, arrestees are photographed, and increasingly their mug shots
are placed into the public domain.196 Local newspapers and media outlets publish
some mug shots, with prostitution cases being a common example.197 Worse yet,
dozens of enterprising (and unseemly) companies publish mug shots on their
websites in an effort to extort money.198 Some of these websites invite individuals to pay anywhere from $30 to $400 to remove their mug shots.199 But, of
course, even if the individual pays, the mug shot may simply turn up on another
site,200 and the individual will have to turn to expensive removal services to clean
up their internet profile.201
If an arrestee’s mug shot remains on the internet—as many of them do—it
will be easily discoverable by potential employers. In some instances, this may
be a good thing: society does not want dangerous people being hired to work
with children and other vulnerable populations. For many individuals, however,
a prior arrest—perhaps from when they were in college—is no longer relevant.
It is particularly irrelevant if the charges were dropped and the person was never

194. See infra notes 195, 197, 199.
195. See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 387, 406 (2006).
196. See infra notes 197, 199.
197. See Art Hubacher, Comment, Every Picture Tells a Story: Is Kansas City’s “John TV” Constitutional?,
46 KAN. L. REV 551, 558–59 (1998).
198. See infra note 199.
199. See Euemi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 557, 559 (2018); Allen Rostron, The Mug Shot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and the
Controversy Sparked by an Unusual New Type of Business, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1321, 1322–24 (2013); David
Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html.
200. See Segal, supra note 199.
201. Observers have called this the “Mugshot Racket.” See Michael Polatsek, Note, Extortion Through the
Public Record: Has the Internet Made Florida’s Sunshine Law Too Bright?, 66 FLA. L. REV. 913, 918 (2014).
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convicted of a crime.202 Yet if the mug shot is the first thing that shows up in an
internet search, it will surely have a deleterious effect when the person applies
for work.203 For instance, in one high-profile case, a domestic violence victim
who was wrongfully arrested by the police had to contend with her mug shot
being all over the internet as she finished medical school and sought employment.204
Put simply, when police decide to make a warrantless arrest, the consequences may last forever, even if the criminal case is ultimately dismissed.
c.

Bail Costs Money, and Inability to Post Bail Leads to Job Loss

The next obvious problem with unnecessary arrests is the cost of bail. In
the not-so-distant past, arrestees were commonly released on their own recognizance.205 Not so any longer.206 Now a majority of felony defendants in large
counties have to come up with cash to get out of jail.207 Recognizance bonds in
misdemeanor cases are still common, but in many places they are far less common than in the past.208 For suspects who are middle-class or wealthy, this is
obviously not much of a problem. They post a cash bond and, if they comply
with the conditions of their release, they receive the cash back when their case is
dismissed.209
Most suspects are not wealthy or even middle-class, however.210 Most arrestees are poor and do not have thousands of dollars, or even hundreds of dollars, available to use for bail.211 Some poor suspects therefore turn to family to
scrape together bail money. Families then undergo hardship by selling their possessions or foregoing basic life necessities to come up with bail money.212
More commonly, bail amounts are simply too high for the suspect and his
family to meet. Arrestees therefore turn to bail bondsman who will post the entire

202. See Segal, supra note 199.
203. Id.
204. See id. Additionally, the mug shot may cause trouble for individuals as they try to form romantic and
other personal relationships.
205. See REAVES, supra note 4, at 20 (showing that in 1990, large counties required money bonds in less
than 40% of cases and that by 2009, the percentage had risen to 60%).
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 711, 716 (2017) (explaining that half of misdemeanor defendants in Harris County are detained pretrial
and that “[o]ther jurisdictions also detain people accused of misdemeanors at surprising rates.”). Recent litigation
in Houston has focused on cash bail requirements and pretrial detention of indigent low-level misdemeanor defendants. See Eli Rosenberg, Judge in Houston Strikes Down Harris County’s Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/us/judge-strikes-down-harris-county-bail-system.html.
209. See Heaton et al., supra note 208, at 721.
210. Id. at 737.
211. See Cherise F. Burdeen, The Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-not-making-bail/477
906/.
212. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1360–
61 (2014).
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bond if the suspect pays 10% up front.213 The rub, however, is that even if all
goes well and the case is dismissed, the bondsman keeps the 10%.214 And 10%
can be a lot of money for poorer members of society. For example, the bail schedule in Los Angeles, California sets bail at $5,000 for loitering on private property,
$20,000 for battery of a police officer, and $25,000 for making criminal
threats.215 If the suspect is fortunate enough to come up with 10% to pay the bail
bondsman, he will have spent hundreds or even thousands of dollars, which may
be the difference between paying next month’s rent and being out on the street.
Matters will be far worse though for the arrestees who cannot afford the
10% to pay a bail bondsman and who must remain in jail.216 These arrestees will
remain incarcerated for weeks or months. Unable to make it to work, many will
lose their jobs, which in turn will cause a cascade of other financial and basic life
problems. Some vulnerable populations—those in drug treatment or homeless
shelters—may lose their beds in the facilities.217 They might even suffer violence
while incarcerated. For example, in 2014, Tyrone Tomlin was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia because a police officer incorrectly believed his
soda straw was paraphernalia for snorting cocaine.218 The judge set bail at
$1,500, but Tomlin was living paycheck to paycheck and had no money to
spare.219 He was sent to Riker’s Island for three weeks, where he was brutally
assaulted by other inmates.220 Only weeks later did prosecutors look carefully at
his case and dismiss the charge.221
d. Wrongful Guilty Pleas, Lost Wages, Anxiety, and Collateral Costs of
Unnecessary Arrests
Mug shots and bail are two obvious consequences of being arrested, but the
pain of the criminal justice process does not end there.
For some misdemeanor arrestees, an unnecessary arrest leads to a wrongful
conviction. If a suspect cannot make bail, he will be incarcerated while he waits
for a prosecutor to review his case.222 And in some jurisdictions, prosecutors do
not appear at the probable cause hearing.223 Indeed, in some offices, prosecutors

213. See Heaton et al., supra note 208, at 721.
214. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.1(b) (4th ed. 2015).
215. See SUPERIOR COURT OF L.A. CTY., 2018 BAIL SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS 12,
15, 20 (2018), https://www.lacourt.org/division/criminal/pdf/misd.pdf.
216. See Sabri Ben-Achour, When You Can’t Make Bail, MARKETPLACE (July 27, 2016, 4:58 PM), https://
www.marketplace.org/2016/07/25/world/when-you-cant-make-bail.
217. See ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN, INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, “FORCED INTO BREAKING THE LAW”: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN CONNECTICUT 18 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/
pdf/news/criminalization_of_homelessness_report_for_web_full_report.pdf.
218. See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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do not look at warrantless arrest cases until days or weeks later.224 In those instances, the arrestee may simply plead guilty to get out of jail and get back to his
family and his job.225 This pressure causes innocent individuals to plead guilty.226
For those who make bail, there will be future court appearances. This means
taking time off from work and suffering anxiety and uncertainty.227 Prosecutors
are extremely busy and may not focus enough attention on a case to dismiss it at
the first court appearance.228 A prosecutor’s later dismissal of a case does not
restore the lost wages or undo emotional turmoil that accompanies the court appearances.
And then there are the collateral consequences outside the criminal justice
system. For example, although the arresting officer may not know it, arrest records are used to make immigration removal decisions.229 Public housing authorities use arrest records to initiate eviction proceedings for failure to comply with
leasing provisions about engaging in criminal activity.230 Employers and licensing entities use arrest information to monitor the off-duty activities of their workers.231 As Professor Eisha Jain explains, a “significant number of employers now
also receive notifications whenever an employee is arrested and fingerprinted”
and “[s]ome employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the arrest.”232 Some police departments also notify social services after a custodial parent has been arrested.233
In sum, even if a prosecutor dismisses a case shortly after arrest, much damage will already have been done. The individual will have suffered lost wages,
anxiety, and a host of noncriminal collateral consequences. Not surprisingly,
poor and minority individuals are more likely to suffer these consequences.234
3.

Burdening Other Criminal Justice Actors

Unnecessary arrests also impose a burden on other actors working in the
criminal justice system. First, and most obviously, the police themselves are burdened by unnecessary arrests. An average arrest takes several hours of officer

224. See id.
225. See Bowers, supra note 176, at 1708–10; Harmon, supra note 18, at 313; Jocelyn Simonson, Bail
Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 589 (2017).
226. See Natapoff, supra note 176, at 1332; Wiseman, supra note 212, at 1355–56.
227. See Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1395 (2018); Harmon, supra note
18, at 313.
228. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial
Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 285–86 (2011).
229. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827–33 (2015).
230. See id. at 833–36.
231. Id. at 839–41.
232. Id. at 839–40.
233. Id. at 841.
234. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2183
(2013) (“The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in receive more law enforcement
in the form of police stops and arrests.”); see also Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 229, at 820 (discussing
how public order policing strategies may disproportionately affect minority communities).
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time.235 That paperwork—which most officers hate236—takes them off the street
and away from protecting the public.
Following arrest, suspects are jailed. Some suspects will quickly make bail
and leave the jails. But those who cannot afford the bail amount will languish,
possibly for days or weeks. Many jails are overcrowded,237 and each additional
inmate makes the facility more dangerous not just for the inmates but the sheriff’s deputies who must safeguard the inmates.238 And incarcerating inmates is
expensive. The average jail detention costs hundreds of dollars per day.239 Unnecessary arrests thus make jails more crowded, more expensive, and less safe.
Then there are the courtroom employees. Clerks must process all the cases.
Judges must hold probable cause hearings. In many jurisdictions, prosecutors
also appear at the probable cause hearings and must spend time, however fleeting, on these unnecessary arrests.240
If the case survives the probable cause hearing—and almost everyone
agrees that the probable cause stage is not a stringent review241—then the case
will fully enter the system. Because the overwhelming majority of criminal defendants are indigent, they will be assigned to a public defender or receive an
appointed a lawyer.242 And, as almost everyone knows, indigent defense lawyers
in many jurisdictions have enormous caseloads that prevent them from devoting
sufficient attention to each client.243
Of course, we should not hesitate to ask police, jailers, clerks, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to do their jobs. But when the system is overloaded, should they be spending time—collectively, enormous amounts of
time—on cases that will be dismissed and could have been screened out of the
system up front? The answer to that question should be “no,” and Part III below
describes a framework for prosecutorial screening of warrantless arrests.

235. See Harmon, supra note 18, at 319.
236. See Christine Hauser, To the Police Dept. It’s Desk Duty. To Some Officers, It’s More Like a Cellblock,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/nyregion/30deskduty.html.
237. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should the Prosecutors Control the
Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 683–85 (2016).
238. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-743, GROWING INMATE CROWDING
NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 64–83 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/
648123.pdf.
239. See Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry, MOTHER JONES (May
2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/bail-bond-prison-industry/.
240. Beyond the probable cause hearing, prosecutors must spend additional time on cases when they are
initially charged as felonies rather than misdemeanors. For an insightful explanation of why prosecutors sometimes prefer cases to be charged as misdemeanors rather than felonies, see Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 795–810 (2016) (explaining how misdemeanors carry fewer procedural protections for defendants but many of the same punishments and collateral consequences).
241. See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 388 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing the burden at a probable
cause hearing as “rather easily met”).
242. See John D. King, Lamentations, Celebrations, and Innovations: Gideon at 50, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 835, 836 (2013).
243. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1053–54 (2005).
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III. THE HARRIS COUNTY APPROACH: PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING BEFORE
ALL WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Up until the early 1970s, police in Harris County, Texas (home to Houston)
filed charges by bringing cases to a justice of the peace.244Although the justices
of the peace were supposed to reject cases in which all elements of the crime
could not be proven, in practice, the judges and their administrative clerks were
not an effective screening mechanism.245 Prosecutors were frustrated because
they were spending a considerable amount of time on weak cases they believed
should not have been filed in the first place.246 In 1973, the elected district attorney wrestled initial control of the cases away from the justices of the peace and
established an “intake” office in which prosecutors, rather than judges or administrative clerks, would vet the cases brought in by police.247 Over four decades
later, Harris County continues to have an intricate system in place in which prosecutors screen all warrantless arrests before charges are filed and before suspects
are taken to jail.248
A. The Structure of the Harris County Intake Process
In Harris County, police officers cannot make any warrantless arrest without first calling the “intake hotline” and receiving approval from a prosecutor.249
If a prosecutor approves charges, the police can process the arrest; if the prosecutor rejects the charges, the officer must release the suspect.250 In short, no suspect can be locked up in Harris County without the case first being approved by
a prosecutor. The process is quite intricate and has multiple checkpoint stages at
which a prosecutor can reject charges.
The Harris County process starts with the officer making a call to the intake
hotline and explaining the situation on the street to one of the intake prosecutors.251 If the prosecutor believes charges would be improper, the officer does
not make the arrest and instead releases the suspect.252 If the prosecutor believes
charges are merited, the officer then types up the defendant’s name, the charges,
the names of any witnesses, a statement of probable cause for the arrest, and the
244. My description of the history and current structure of the Harris County system in Sections II.A and
II.B is based primarily on an interview with Jim Leitner, Bureau Chief of the Grand Jury and Intake Division,
which I conducted at the Harris County District Attorney’s Office on June 5, 2017.
245. Leitner Interview, supra note 6.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Officers are not obligated to call the intake line before charging a Class C misdemeanor because Class
C offenses do not carry the possibility of jail time. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.23 (West 2019). Those charged
with class C offenses are ticketed and released.
250. See supra text accompanying note 8.
251. See supra text accompanying note 7.
252. On occasion, the officer will ask to speak to a supervising prosecutor in an effort to overrule the intake
prosecutor. Less frequently, when a prosecutor rejects the charges, an officer will try to do an end-run around the
rejection by calling back and trying to speak with a different prosecutor. But, as described below, because there
are only a few intake prosecutors working each shift, this end-run effort is rare and unlikely to succeed.

860

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

name of the intake prosecutor who approved the charges.253 The officer then inputs that information into a computer database.254 Thereafter, an administrative
assistant in the District Attorney’s Office prints the file255 so that an intake prosecutor—typically someone other than the prosecutor who answered the phone
call—can review it when there is a lull in calls to the hotline.256 This prosecutorial
review is effectively a second bite at the apple. If there was a miscommunication
during the initial phone call or if the screening prosecutor has concerns about the
arrest, the prosecutor still has the option to reject charges.257 The paper screening
of the case typically occurs within two hours of arrest.258
After the initial phone call and the paper copy review, the case proceeds to
a third review.259 A different felony prosecutor in charge of the probable cause
docket reviews the case and brings it before the magistrate who is conducting the
probable cause hearings.260 This prosecutor—usually the third prosecutor to look
at the case—also has the authority to reject charges and order the suspect released.261 Because there are typically nine probable cause dockets per day, this
third prosecutor usually screens each case within a few hours of the initial arrest.262
In sum, three different Harris County prosecutors typically review each
warrantless arrest before the case ever gets to a magistrate.263 The first prosecutor
is in a position to stop the arrest from happening in the first place. The next two
prosecutors are in a position to dismiss the case shortly after arrest and have the
suspect released.
Running such an elaborate intake system is a considerable staffing commitment. There are typically five prosecutors assigned to the intake office at any
given time.264 A division chief, who is a high-ranking senior attorney, oversees
the entire intake system.265 Two senior felony prosecutors—one who answers
intake calls and does paper screening and the other who is in charge of the probable cause docket—work full-time in that department.266 Another two lawyers
who are more junior felony or misdemeanor prosecutors also answer calls to the

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Leitner Interview, supra note 6.
Id.
A copy also goes to the clerk’s office. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hotline.267 In addition, there are three secretaries who handle the paperwork.268
These eight employees work the daytime shift.269
Importantly, Harris County also fully staffs the intake division after traditional business hours have ended.270 Dozens of prosecutors from other parts of
the office agree to work after-hours intake shifts in exchange for overtime pay.271
The first overtime shift runs from 5 p.m. to midnight, and the second intake shift
runs from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.272 Additionally, all weekend shifts are staffed by
prosecutors working for overtime pay.273 The overtime pay is not a flat rate, but
rather is based on a multiple of each prosecutor’s base salary.274 Accordingly,
more experienced senior prosecutors are paid more and have a strong financial
incentive to work the overtime intake shifts. Because multiple prosecutors and
staff are working intake shifts twenty-four hours a day, the system is expensive
to operate. The 2014–2015 budget for the division was $6.2 million.275
B. Cost and Efficiency Savings Under the Harris County Model
Although exact numbers are not available, it appears that Harris County
intake prosecutors reject a considerable number of charges requested by police
officers. In a 2006 study, researchers at Texas A&M University interviewed
“prosecutors and Houston police [and] conservatively estimate[d] the rate of
early case rejection (i.e., while the defendant is still on the street) to be at least
ten percent.”276 In reviewing the Harris County system, I spoke with current and
former Harris County prosecutors, reviewed written declination files from the
intake office, and observed an evening intake shift.277 Although anecdotal, all of
those data points suggested to me that prosecutors reject charges with some frequency.
The type of charges Harris County prosecutors reject run the gamut. For
example, in my review of charges that Harris County prosecutors rejected over
the weekend of June 3–4, 2017, I saw two cases in which police officers from

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. For many years, prosecutors were paid time-and-a-half to work evening and weekend intake shifts. In
mid-2017, to save money, overtime was reduced to prosecutors’ regular salary rate. Id.
275. See Pablo A. Ormachea et al., The Hidden Cost of No Action Dispositions and the High Savings of
Preauthorizing Arrests with Prosecutors 7 (NeuLaw, Working Paper, 2015).
276. See DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST., TEX. A&M UNIV., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
DIRECT ELECTRONIC FILING IN CRIMINAL CASES: CLOSING THE PAPER TRAP 73 (2006) (on file with the author).
277. On Monday, June 5, 2017, Jim Leitner, the Bureau Chief of the Harris County Grand Jury and Intake
Division allowed me to review cases in which prosecutors had declined charges over the preceding weekend.
Leitner Interview, supra note 6. That evening, he also allowed me to observe the evening intake shift and to sit
with prosecutors as they answered calls from police officers from around the county. I also spoke with former
Harris County prosecutors Laura Killinger, Danny Lacayo, and Ed McClees. See Killinger Interview, supra note
168; Lacayo Interview, supra note 174; McClees Interview, supra note 160.
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two different departments sought charges against suspects for being a felon in
possession of a firearm.278 The police officers—certainly in good faith—looked
at their databases and saw that these two defendants were on deferred adjudication for felony charges.279 However, because the officers did not have an intricate
understanding of Texas law, they did not understand that deferred adjudication
does not count as a conviction and thus those individuals were not felons for
purposes of the felon in possession statute.280 In short, it would be impossible to
convict them because they could not be felons in possession under Texas law.281
Nevertheless, the police officers sought to arrest the two suspects and, in any
other jurisdiction, the two individuals likely would have been incarcerated for
days or longer, until a prosecutor looked at the case and dismissed the charges.282
Because the officers had to preclear the arrests with a Harris County intake prosecutor, however, the suspects were released at the scene.283
I observed written reports of other cases from the weekend of June 3–4
where prosecutors rejected charges because, unbeknownst to the police, it would
be impossible to prove all the elements of the offense.284 For instance, a police
officer tried to arrest a suspect for possession of a fraudulent credit card.285 The
intake prosecutor however rejected the charge because the police officer did not
have any evidence—as the statute requires—that the individual had tried to use
the card.286 In another case, an officer tried to arrest a defendant for Class B theft,
but the prosecutor rejected the charge because there was no evidence the property
was worth more than $100, as the statute requires to arrest a person for theft.287
Other cases where intake prosecutors rejected charges fall under the general
heading of “contempt of cop.” In one case from the weekend of June 3–4, officers
sought charges for a “terroristic threat” because the suspect was threatening the
officers with violence.288 The threat, however, was not “imminent” as required
by the statute, and the intake prosecutor rejected the charge.289 In interviews,
former prosecutors told me that police often try to charge suspects with the
crimes of “evading arrest with a motor vehicle” or “resisting arrest” because the
suspects did not pull over quickly or because they pulled their hands away while

278. Leitner Interview, supra note 6
279. Id.
280. See Ramon v. State, No. 13-15-00146-CR, 2016 WL 3364979 *4–5 (Tex. App. June 16, 2016).
281. After Jim Leitner of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office explained this to me, it took me more
than thirty minutes of legal research to find case law confirming it. If it takes a law professor with access to
Westlaw that long, it is unlikely that the typical police officer will know it.
282. See supra text accompanying note 5.
283. See supra text accompanying note 6.
284. See supra note 277.
285. See supra note 277.
286. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.31(b) (West 2019).
287. Theft of less than $100 is a Class C misdemeanor, which is punishable only by a fine. See TEX. PENAL
CODE § 31.03(e) (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.23 (West 2019).
288. See supra note 277.
289. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a)(2) (West 2019).
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being handcuffed.290 These former prosecutors explained that intake prosecutors
often reject these charges because proving the mens rea would be impossible.291
In other cases, Harris County prosecutors reject charges because police fail
to understand that it will be difficult or impossible for prosecutors to prove the
necessary mens rea to convict the suspect. For example, as noted above,292 former prosecutors explained that airport police officers often want to file charges
when a passenger is found to have a weapon in his carry-on bag at airport security.293 Prosecutors, however, often reject those charges because the statute requires an intentional mens rea, rather than recklessness or negligence, and proving an intentional mens rea is very difficult. Indeed, while observing an intake
shift on the evening of June 5, 2017, I witnessed a prosecutor reject charges for
a suspect after a TSA agent found a large knife in his bag at the airport.
In other cases that I observed, prosecutors rejected what they considered
unnecessary extra charges. In one example, officers sought two charges for evading arrest, but the prosecutor determined that all of the misconduct occurred in
one transaction and thus filed only one count. In another case, police submitted
multiple drug charges even though the defendant was in possession of only one
drug. The prosecutor filed only one count. Indeed, I saw multiple instances in
which prosecutors filed fewer drug charges than police requested. In one instance, police wanted to charge a defendant with .63 grams of cocaine and .04
grams of methamphetamine. The prosecutor accepted the former charge, but rejected the latter as unnecessary.
I also observed prosecutors repeatedly reject charges that would cause judicial backlogs. When police bring in both felony and misdemeanor charges,
Harris County intake prosecutors often decline to file some of the misdemeanor
charges out of judicial economy. For instance, I observed one intake call in which
police stopped a woman for driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle.
The officer also sought charges for drug possession, and a misdemeanor charge
for unlawful possession of a firearm. The prosecutor declined the firearm charge
because misdemeanor charges are processed in a different court and a defendant
would be unlikely to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge when she has pending
felony charges in another court that have not been resolved. Rather than have a
low-level case clog the docket in misdemeanor court, the prosecutor chose not to
file the gun charge and proceeded only on the felony charges. This streamlining—which likely would not have happened in the absence of a prosecutor intake
office—upsets some police officers, who may believe that suspects should be
charged for all of the offenses they have plausibly committed.294

290. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
291. Both the evading and resisting charges require the suspect to act intentionally. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§§ 38.03(a), 38.04(a) (West 2019).
292. See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
293. See Killinger Interview, supra note 168; McClees Interview, supra note 160. The statutory provision
is TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.03(5) (West 2019).
294. See Fairfax, supra note 187, at 1271.
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Intake prosecutors also decline to file charges as a matter of justice. For
example, police officers are now frequently present in, or called to, public
schools.295 When a fight breaks out between high school teenagers, the police
sometimes want to charge one or both of the students.296 Prosecutors, however,
sometimes decline to file those charges because they do not believe the teenagers
should have a criminal record for a high school fight.297
These anecdotal examples indicate that Harris County prosecutors regularly screen out weak, inefficient, and unjust charges prior to arrest.298 Further
evidence can be found in Harris County’s low dismissal rate. A working paper
by Pablo Ormachea and colleagues from the Center for Science and Law used a
criminal records database to assess the number of “no action” dispositions and
found the number in Harris County to be dramatically lower than in other jurisdictions.299 For instance, in 2011, Harris County dropped 1,177 charges, compared with 35,030 in Miami-Dade County.300
The benefits of the Harris County intake system are not limited to rejecting
charges. Having a prosecutor work with a police officer at the time of arrest
strengthens cases that will be filed. For instance, while observing the intake shift
on June 5, 2017, I observed the chief of the intake division—who has three decades of experience as a prosecutor and defense attorney—explain to an officer
that he needed additional information in order to successfully prosecute a suspect
for possession of marijuana in a drug-free school zone. In his report, the officer
had failed to identify the name and location of the school as required by the statute.301 If the prosecutor had not instructed the officer to correct this omission
immediately, it is possible that weeks later when the problem was discovered
that the officer might not have remembered the location and the case would have
to be dismissed. A similar problem occurs when police seek charges for theft of
a firearm. The officers do not always understand that finding a defendant in possession of a seemingly stolen firearm is not sufficient. Prosecutors must prove
the firearm has been taken from its owner, and thus the charging documents must
specify the name of the owner.302
Prosecutor involvement at the arrest stage also allows for a more careful
look at bond amounts and helps to keep dangerous individuals off the street. In
many states, including Texas, the Penal Code sets forth a complicated scheme of

295. See Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH U. L. REV. 919, 922
(2016).
296. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role
of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 386 (2013).
297. See id. at 386–87 (noting racial disparities in charging, and advocating for greater declination of
charges).
298. Harris County also has a system in place to make sure rejected cases were handled correctly. The
Division Chief reviews every rejected case within a day of the rejection. Therefore, if a case was wrongly rejected,
prosecutors can quickly move to charge the defendant.
299. See Ormachea et al., supra note 275, at 2–3.
300. Id. at 4.
301. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.134 (West 2019).
302. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(e)(4)(C) (West 2019); Leitner Interview, supra note 6.
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charging enhancements.303 In one case I observed during the June 5, 2017, intake
shift, police sought a charge that would typically have carried a $1,000 bond
under the bond schedule. When the intake prosecutor looked carefully at the defendant’s criminal history, though, he was able to deconstruct the long rap sheet
and determine that the defendant had two prior serious felony convictions with
time spent in the state penitentiary. At the moment of arrest, the prosecutor therefore was able to make a recommendation that the defendant be treated as a habitual offender and the suspect be denied bond. A magistrate judge might have
made the same discovery from reviewing the defendant’s criminal history, but
not necessarily.
In sum, by prescreening warrantless arrests, Harris County prosecutors are
able to prevent flawed cases from being filed, reduce the number of charges to
prevent clogs in the system, and screen out charges that while technically appropriate might be unjust. At the same time, prosecutors are able to strengthen cases
that will be filed by having police acquire key information immediately rather
than scrambling for it days or weeks after charges are filed.

303.

See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42 (West 2019).
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Replicating the Harris County Approach in El Paso and Montgomery
Counties

One objection to the Harris County system of prosecutorial prescreening of
warrantless arrests is that it is labor intensive and expensive. Harris County is the
third largest county in the country and therefore has a substantial budget and a
large enough number of employees to have some prosecutors work in its intake
division.304 By contrast, smaller jurisdictions have less money and smaller staffs
and would thus find it difficult to fund an intake division. This concern is obviously logical. Nevertheless, the Harris County approach has been replicated in
the far smaller El Paso and Montgomery counties in Texas. Moreover, those
counties have discovered that they are actually saving money by using the Harris
County approach.
1.

El Paso Recognized the Cost and Efficiency Savings Two Decades Ago

In 1994, El Paso County, Texas—which has a population six times smaller
than Harris County305—decided to replicate the Harris County intake system.
Prosecutors began to screen warrantless arrests twenty-four hours a day.306 Because El Paso is a much smaller jurisdiction, it only has one prosecutor work the
intake shift at a time, rather than the three or four prosecutors working simultaneously in Harris County.307 The El Paso police (a city agency) and the prosecutor’s office (a county department) reached a formal financial arrangement and
drew up an interlocal governmental agreement to distribute the costs of the system.308 City and county officials have supported the program for over twenty
years because they believe it ultimately saves money by (1) reducing the number
of people incarcerated; (2) reducing the time of each defendant’s pretrial incarceration; and (3) reducing time spent on cases by prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and courts.309
A 2006 study by researchers at Texas A&M University offered dramatic
documentation of the financial savings that come when prosecutors prescreen
arrests and file charges electronically from their office.310 Researchers compared
misdemeanor cases disposed of in calendar year 2004 in Harris, El Paso, and
Bexar counties in Texas.311 In Harris County, all of the cases were screened by

304. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Intake Prosecutor: Prosecutorial Screening Before the Police Make Warrantless Arrests 30 (William & Mary Law School, Research Paper No. 09-362), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=3037172.
305. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/elpasocountytexas/PST045216 (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
306. See Telephone Interview with Claudia Duran, Project Manager, El Paso County District Attorney’s
Office (June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Duran Interview].
307. See id.
308. The agreement is re-authorized each year. See, e.g., INTERLOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT (2016)
(on file with the author).
309. See Duran Interview, supra note 306.
310. See generally CARMICHAEL ET AL., supra note 276.
311. Id. at 2–3.
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prosecutors at the moment of arrest.312 In Bexar County, none were screened.313
In El Paso (in 2004), the cases handled by the El Paso Police Department—about
two-thirds of the total—were screened by prosecutors at the moment of arrest,
while the cases handled by the El Paso Sheriff’s Office were not screened by
prosecutors.314
The researchers found that El Paso prosecutors rejected 19% of the cases
that city police officers brought in.315 In total, El Paso prosecutors rejected thousands of misdemeanor cases where police sought charges.316 From a financial
standpoint, the study found that if El Paso moved to a system in which prosecutors screened all misdemeanor cases, it would save the county approximately
$1.5 million in costs associated with transportation, jailing, offense report submission, magistrate appearances, and appointed counsel.317 It also would save
the prospective defendants an estimated $1.23 million that they would have spent
on bond, retained counsel, and lost wages had they been incarcerated.318 And, of
course, this would be just the savings in misdemeanor cases.
Although there was not comparable data for Harris County, the researchers
reported that “prosecutors and Houston police interviewed conservatively estimate the rate of early case rejection (i.e., while the defendant is still on the street)
to be at least ten percent.”319 Given that Houston handles roughly five times as
many cases as El Paso,320 the savings to Harris County and its defendants are
likely dramatically greater than those outlined above for El Paso.
Additionally, because prosecutors in Harris County and El Paso County
screened the cases at the moment of arrest and could electronically file the documents themselves without waiting for paperwork to be sent over from the police, cases that did result in arrest were processed far faster.321 In Harris County
(where all cases go through the intake office), 25% of misdemeanor cases were
disposed of within three days of arrest; in El Paso (where, at the time, two-thirds
of misdemeanor cases were screened by prosecutors) 15% of cases were disposed
of in three days.322 By contrast, in Bexar County, which does not have prosecutors screen any cases, 0% of the cases were resolved in three days.323 This data
indicates that by having prosecutors screen cases and file charges electronically

312. See id. at 18–19, 39.
313. See id. at 33–37, 39.
314. See id. at 25–32, 39. In recent years, El Paso has moved to prosecutorial prescreening of all misdemeanor cases. See E-mail from Claudia Duran, Project Manager, El Paso County District Attorney’s Office, to
author (June 8, 2017).
315. See CARMICHAEL ET AL., supra note 276, at 73.
316. See DIRECT ELECTRONIC FILING IN CRIMINAL CASES: CLOSING THE PAPER TRAP, TASK FORCE
ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 21, http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/34550/070424_ClosingPaper_Presentation_
FINAL.pdf.
317. See id. at 19–21.
318. See id.
319. CARMICHAEL ET AL., supra note 276, at 73.
320. See id. at 17, 23.
321. Id. at 74.
322. See id.
323. See id.
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(rather than waiting for police to forward their reports days or weeks later) the
strongest cases are resolved quickly with many defendants pleading guilty in the
first few days after arrest. These fast dispositions mean the counties spend less
money on jail costs and defendants save money by extricating themselves from
the system and getting back to their jobs. Researchers estimated that the faster
case processing that comes with prosecutorial screening and electronic filing
could save El Paso County $3.95 million and save defendants $3.26 million.324
And, once again, this is just in misdemeanor cases.
In sum, the researchers concluded that other jurisdictions should adopt
twenty-four hour prosecutorial screening of warrantless arrests.325 The benefits
included: a reduction (by up to 20%) in the number of charges, prompt disposition of charges that are filed, less paperwork for police, and more accurate charging decisions.326 Additionally, the researchers found that counties employing the
Harris County model would save money because of reduced jail admissions, reduced inmate transportation costs, fewer court-appointed assignments, and less
prosecutorial time spent on cases later in the process.327 They also recognized
that “[w]here cases are screened out at arrest, defendants are spared the costs of
private attorney fees, bond fees, lost wages, and family disruption in a case that
would have ultimately been rejected by the prosecutor.”328
2.

Montgomery County Adopted a Similar System a Decade Ago

Montgomery County, Texas—a medium sized county of slightly more than
500,000 people—is directly north of Houston and occasionally hires former Harris County prosecutors.329 In 2008, likely influenced by its southern neighbor,
Montgomery County established its own intake system for prosecutors to screen
warrantless arrests.330 Because it is a smaller office, Montgomery’s process is
slightly different than that in Harris and El Paso.331 The core goal however—
having prosecutors assist police with warrantless arrests and carefully vet
charges—is identical.332
In Montgomery County, a rotating prosecutor is assigned to the jail twentyfour hours per day to guide officers on charges and offer advice on evidence
collection.333 Police either call the intake hotline or come in person to present
324.

See DIRECT ELECTRONIC FILING IN CRIMINAL CASES: CLOSING THE PAPER TRAP, supra note 316, at

33.
325. See CARMICHAEL ET AL., supra note 276, at 103–04.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 105.
328. Id.
329. The description of the Montgomery County system is based on an interview I conducted with Montgomery County prosecutors Mike Holley, First Assistant District Attorney, and Darla Faulkner, the chief prosecutor in the Intake Division, on June 8, 2017. Interview with Mike Holley, First Assistant Dist. Attorney & Darla
Faulkner, Chief Prosecutor, Intake Div., Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office (June 8, 2017).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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possible charges.334 The prosecutor then accepts the charges, modifies the officer’s proposed charges, or rejects the charges altogether.335
The Montgomery County system actually began with prosecutors volunteering their time after hours because they saw the value in improving evidence
collection and weeding out weak charges early in the process.336 Later, the system became more formalized. Because it is smaller than Harris County, the
Montgomery County intake process uses fewer prosecutors and staff members.
A rotating prosecutor is assigned to the intake office during business hours and
a different, permanent prosecutor works the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift.337 Between 5 p.m. and midnight and on weekends, prosecutors from other parts of the
office work the intake shift for overtime pay.338
Prosecutors in Montgomery County explained that the intake system pays
for itself in a variety of ways. First, prosecutors are able to find the appropriate
charges very early, rather than having to do that work later. Second, in cases
where there is a victim—particularly family violence cases—prosecutors are
able to move quickly to both protect the victim and to encourage her to cooperate
with the prosecution rather than being convinced by the suspect to recant. Third,
early involvement in the case enables prosecutors to have input on the bond
amount, sometimes encouraging the judge to increase the amount to protect the
community and other times suggesting a lower amount to remove less dangerous
individuals from pretrial detention.
IV. EXPANDING PROSECUTORIAL PRE-SCREENING OF WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
TO OTHER COUNTIES
The Harris County experience demonstrates that it is possible for a large
prosecutor’s office to screen all warrantless arrests before police take suspects
into custody. The experience in El Paso County (with a population of 660,000)
and Montgomery County (with a population of 500,000) shows that it is feasible
for prosecutors in medium-sized counties to prescreen all warrantless arrests.339
Of course, implementing prosecutorial screening requires a considerable investment in up-front personnel costs. Large and medium-sized counties would have
to hire one or more prosecutors (depending on the size of the office) to work the
day shifts, and they would have to pay overtime for the evening and weekend
shifts.340 But the cost savings in the long run from rejecting weak cases that
would be later dismissed (as well as the other efficiencies described in Section
III.B) would seemingly more than offset the personnel costs. Indeed, the Texas
334. Id.
335. Unlike Harris County, it is possible for law enforcement officers in Montgomery County to jail a suspect prior to asking prosecutors to accept charges. Supervising prosecutors said that this happens extremely rarely
however. See id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See supra Subsections III.C.1, III.C.2.
340. See supra notes 270–75 and accompanying text.
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A&M study comparing prosecutors’ offices that have intake offices with a
county that does not screen cases demonstrated millions of dollars in potential
savings to the counties and the defendants.341 As such, the simple policy prescription of this Article is that large and medium-sized counties should follow
the Harris County approach and have prosecutors prescreen all warrantless arrests.
A remaining question is whether prosecutorial screening of warrantless arrests can be implemented in small counties. While large and medium-sized prosecutor’s offices handle a majority of the criminal cases in the United States,342 it
is nevertheless the case that most prosecutors’ offices in the United States are
relatively small.343 Over 70% of prosecutor’s offices serve districts with populations of less than 100,000 people.344 And in those small districts, the average
office has only four prosecutors.345 It simply would not be feasible for such
leanly staffed offices to screen cases around the clock.
A partial solution would be for states to fund intake prosecutors who can
be shared by small counties.346 Prosecutors in a state office would answer calls
from police around the state and approve, reject, or modify charges prior to warrantless arrests. If police seek to bring an obviously meritless case, or if they seek
felony charges when only a misdemeanor prosecution would be appropriate, the
state intake prosecutor would reject those charges, at least for the time being.347
The case for state involvement is straightforward. First, with the exception
of a small number of municipal offenses, state law sets forth criminal liability.348
As such, state prosecutors are just as well situated as local prosecutors to determine whether a suspect’s conduct met the elements set forth in the state penal
code.349 Second, because existing intake systems screen charges by phone, there
is no need for the intake prosecutor to be in the same county as the police officer
and the suspect. Third, while criminal prosecutions are mostly local in the United
States, the decision to input a case into the criminal justice system affects numerous entities outside of the locality. Public defenders and courts must use their
state funding to deal with charges filed by police.350 Arrestees are often housed

341. See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text.
342. See STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ234211, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.4 (2011).
343. See id. at 4 tbl.2.
344. Id. at 2.
345. See id.
346. If a local prosecutor’s office already has its own intake department, it would not need to make use of
the state office.
347. If police believe that the state intake prosecutor incorrectly rejected charges, they could always approach their local prosecutor’s office and seek to have the local prosecutor pursue an arrest warrant. In this way,
ultimate prosecutorial control would continue to rest with local prosecutors.
348. Logan, supra note 158, at 99; see also Stuntz, supra note 16, at 515.
349. Enforcement priorities—such as not dropping domestic violence charges or deciding to downgrade
possession of a trace amount of a controlled substance to possession of drug paraphernalia—would remain in the
hands of local prosecutors.
350. In some jurisdictions, however, public defender funding falls to the counties. See Cara H. Drinan, The
Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 427, 458–59 (2009).
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in regional jails that handle inmates from multiple counties.351 States supervise
those jails and the state attorney general’s office must deal with lawsuits about
confinement conditions.352 Moreover, many local district attorneys’ offices already receive state funds to supplement their local budgets.353 In short, while
criminal prosecutions are local—and will certainly remain that way354—there are
systemic reasons for states to allot funds to weed out weak cases early in the
process.
Having state prosecutors answer an intake line would not threaten local
control of charging decisions. If a state intake prosecutor were to reject a case,
that would not bar further review by the local prosecutor. Police could still bring
the case to the local prosecutor during normal business hours, and if the local
prosecutor believed the case was strong enough, she could ask a magistrate to
issue an arrest warrant. The state intake prosecutor would therefore only serve as
a temporary speed bump for the weakest warrantless arrests.
In the alternative, if the idea of a centralized state intake prosecutor is too
radical, states could take a more modest step by simply providing grant funding
to counties to hire their own local intake prosecutors. A number of prosecutor’s
offices I spoke with suggested they would be interested in state funds to hire their
own intake prosecutors.355
V. CONCLUSION
For many years, criminal justice reformers have paid close attention to excessively long sentences.356 Recently, reform efforts have focused on an earlier

351. See Jennifer Feehan, Prosecutor Calls for Help to Keep Regional Jail Open, TOLEDO BLADE (Nov. 21,
2015), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/2015/11/21/Prosecutor-calls-for-help-to-keep-regional-jail-open/stories/feed/index.rss (noting dispute over Toledo’s failure to pay its share of costs).
352. There are also indirect costs. When suspects are needlessly arrested and cannot make bail, they often
lose their jobs while incarcerated. They may then turn to state public assistance programs to help them get back
on their feet. See Tami Luhby, Unemployment Benefits Cost: $520 Billion, CNN: BUSINESS (Nov. 12, 2012, 1:46
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2012/11/29/news/economy/unemployment-benefits-cost/index.html.
353. See CAROL DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ193441
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001 4 (2002) (noting that about half of prosecutor’s offices surveyed reported
receiving some funding from state sources).
354. I have argued for eliminating local control of capital punishment. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide
Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 359
(2010). Faith in local control is so strong however that even that proposal met with serious objection. See Stephen
F. Smith, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 120–21 (2011).
355. Most offices indicated that they would not be interested in a statewide call line, but would be interested
in state funding. See, e.g., E-mail from Wesley Wittig, supra note 83 (“Hard to turn down funding, but . . . [w]e
are not interested in a statewide call line—we are positioned to make the best decisions for our community
here.”).
356. For instance, Families Against Mandatory Minimums has been lobbying for shorter sentences since
1991. FAMM’s History, FAMM, http://famm.org/about/famms-history/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
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part of the criminal justice system and sought to eliminate over-charging by prosecutors357 and the practice of cash bail.358 While those are all worthy efforts, this
Article suggests an even earlier intervention point.
Almost all counties in the United States put initial arrest decisions in the
hands of police, not prosecutors.359 In some large counties, prosecutors then step
into the process within twelve hours.360 More commonly, prosecutors do not
have a role until the probable cause hearing, which can be as late as forty-eight
hours after arrest.361 And in some jurisdictions, prosecutors do not have any role
until even later in the process, leaving suspects locked up for weeks before a
prosecutor looks at the case.362
In almost all jurisdictions, it is the police, not the prosecutor, who trigger a
cascade of effects for arrestees.363 Warrantless arrests trigger a need to post bail;
an increased deportation risk; the prospect of losing a job; public housing problems; and, particularly in misdemeanor cases, considerable pressure to plead
guilty. Warrantless arrests also create work for jailers, clerks, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders.
The cascade of consequences triggered by warrantless arrests would not be
concerning if we had confidence the police were not over-arresting and were
filing the right set of charges. Yet strong evidence indicates reason for alarm. For
decades, prosecutors across the country have dismissed 25% of the felony cases
filed by police.364 There is no good data on the dismissal rates for misdemeanor
cases, although basic common sense suggests dismissals are common when
lower-stakes cases are involved. High dismissal rates tell us that the hands-off
approach taken by most prosecutors is not only inefficient for the key players in
the system but also unfair to the enormous number of arrestees who must suffer
through the criminal justice process only to see the State later conclude there is
no basis to proceed with their cases.365
A few jurisdictions have found a better way. In Harris County, Texas—and
at least two medium-sized counties that have followed suit—prosecutors screen
all warrantless arrests.366 No one is taken to jail without a prosecutor first reviewing the case.367 And prosecutors regularly reject charges while the potential arrestee is still on the street.368 The result is that suspects are released immediately
357. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, 8 Ways to Stop Overzealous Prosecutors from Destroying Lives,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/8-ways-to-stop-overzealousprosecutors-from-destroying-lives/267360/.
358. Recent litigation in Harris County, Texas has targeted the cash bail system for poor defendants charged
with low-level misdemeanors. See Rosenberg, supra note 208.
359. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
365. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 266 (1979).
366. See supra Subsections III.C.1, III.C.2.
367. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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rather than being left to languish for days, weeks, or months before their cases
are dismissed.
The Harris County system involves considerable up-front costs because at
least one prosecutor must be on duty twenty-four hours a day to review calls
from police.369 The system is nevertheless logistically and financially feasible.
Many prosecutor’s offices already have hotlines in place for police to ask prosecutors questions.370 Calls to these hotlines would simply become mandatory rather than optional. And while the costs of staffing prosecutors twenty-four hours
a day would be considerable, counties would recoup the costs (and likely even
see overall costs decline) by saving money on jail admissions, transportation of
inmates, unnecessary police reports, court costs, and public defender involvement, to name just a few. In short, counties have the opportunity to simultaneously reduce harm to arrestees and limit the workload of numerous criminal justice actors by having prosecutors pre-screen warrantless arrests.

369.
370.

See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

